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Introduction 
This working paper examines the monitoring, enforcement and compliance of mining 
regulation in Armenia. It identifies the main gaps, international best practices and proposes 
practical ways for government to improve mining sector monitoring, enforcement and 
compliance. Monitoring is the process through which governments track and enforce 
compliance with regulation. It is the only means of determining if proponents adhere to 
requirements stipulated in relevant legislation, regulation and contracts. Monitoring and 
enforcement are essential to ensuring that mining projects proceed in accordance with the 
legal framework. Monitoring the mining industry includes: 
 reviewing laws and contracts to understand companies’ obligations; 
 monitoring companies’ activities to determine compliance with those obligations; 
 communicating information to address any areas of non-compliance; and 
 enforcing laws and contracts when companies fail to comply. 
For the process to work, monitoring requires participation and cooperation from a range of 
stakeholders throughout the life of a mining project. By working together, companies, civil 
society, government and parliament can effectively conduct the oversight necessary to avoid 
potential social and environmental harms. Governments and companies must share 
information including not only contracts, but also ongoing project details, such as cost, 
revenue and production figures. Civil society and parliament can improve governance by 
scrutinising the activities of both companies and the government. 
Current situation in Armenia 
A prevailing culture of secrecy limits the opportunities for open, honest and transparent 
conversations within and between teams, ministries and committees. It also prevents the 
roles and responsibilities of various organisations to be clearly demarcated. In addition, 
several regulatory agencies do not have the required technical skills and experience to ensure 
effective oversight of the sector. 
The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MENR) is responsible for all aspects of mining 
sector administration and regulation, and mineral sector policy development. The MENR 
devotes most of its resources to keeping track of mineral balances and assessing permit 
applications and inspecting companies to verify reserves and production rates and to 
administer the mineral licensing process. The strong focus and significant human resources 
devoted to reserves verifications, approvals and inspections does not support a sustainable 
mineral sector. 
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The Ministry of Nature Protection (MNP) is responsible for all aspects of policy development 
and implementation for environmental protection and rational use of natural resources in 
Armenia. A key issue at the MNP is the lack of human as well as technical capacity. Within the 
MNP, the Environmental Impact Expertise Centre (EIEC) performs the expert examination of 
EIA for exploration and mining projects. While the EIA Law requires social aspects to be 
included in the assessment, the EIEC staff is not qualified to ensure compliance. 
The Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) is responsible for the safety examination of 
mining permit applications, including the assessment of the technical and safety aspects of 
tailings dams. The level of technical expertise with regards to tailings dam construction and 
management is inadequate.1 
International best practice 
Over the past three decades, more than one hundred jurisdictions have amended their 
mining laws and regulations. A parallel surge in sector activity has placed tremendous 
regulatory burden on governments that lack the required capacity to ensure appropriate 
oversight of the sector. While mining sector activity has increased dramatically, monitoring 
and enforcement have not kept pace. Problems with government oversight exist in every 
country with a substantial mining sector, including the United States, Australia and Canada.  
While no country has mastered the challenges, the monitoring gap is especially acute in 
developing country jurisdictions with weak regulatory systems. Often, the problem is 
attributed to staffing or capacity, but there is an underlying problem of incentives. In 
developed and developing jurisdictions alike, political forces have often favoured strong 
promotional mechanisms and weak oversight. Checks and balances are often written into the 
rules but unrewarded in practice.2 Despite the challenges, good practices are emerging in a 
number of countries. Key elements of international best practice are summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2: Elements of best regulatory practice3 
                                                          
1 The World Bank (2016), Armenia: Strategic Mineral Sector Sustainability Assessment, April. 
2 Smith, E., & Rosenblum, P. (2011). Enforcing the Rules: Government and Citizen Oversight of Mining. 
Revenue Watch Institute.  
3 Adapted from Vivoda, V. (2008). Assessment of the governance performance of the regulatory regime 
governing foreign mining investment in the Philippines. Minerals & Energy – Raw Materials Report, 23(3): 127–
43; Vivoda, V. (2009). Resource nationalism, bargaining and international oil companies: challenges and change 
in the new millennium. New Political Economy, 14(4): 517–34; O’Callaghan, T. (2010). Patience is a virtue: 
problems of regulatory governance in the Indonesian mining sector. Resources Policy, 35(3): 218–25; Vivoda, V. 
(2011). Determinants of foreign direct investment in the mining sector in Asia: a comparative analysis between 
China and India. Resources Policy, 36(1): 49–59; O’Callaghan, T., & Vivoda, V. (2015). Problems of regulatory 
governance in the mining sector in Asia. Transnational Corporations, 22(1): 31–57; and Cornish, G., & Vivoda, V. 
(2016). Myanmar’s extractive industries: an institutional and regulatory assessment. Extractive Industries and 
Society, in press. 
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Clarity of policy objectives If overarching sectoral policy objectives act as guiding principles 
in associated laws and regulations this should facilitate 
consistency in regulatory oversight. 
Uniform legal framework 
 
Effective sector oversight requires clear lines of responsibility 
between various regulating agencies in order to minimise overlap 
or uncertainty regarding respective roles in sector 
administration. 
Capacity 
 
A regulating agency should have access to an adequate budget 
and staff with required level of technical expertise and 
experience in order to optimally perform oversight functions. 
Independence / autonomy 
 
A regulating agency should perform its mandated oversight 
functions without intervention (or capture) by political or 
commercial interests / conflict of interests. 
Transparency and accountability 
 
Project proponents, affected stakeholders and other interested 
parties should have access to laws and regulations and be 
informed about regulatory decisions and decision-making 
processes. Regulatory decisions can be challenged through the 
legal system. 
Stakeholder participation 
 
Affected stakeholders and other interested parties should be 
able to participate in regulatory processes through consultation 
and other formal and informal participatory mechanisms. 
National mineral, mining or resource policy is essential for ensuring that development and 
regulation of the sector hold together and adhere to the overall vision for national 
development. Mineral policy is the statement of government strategy to maximise revenue 
and exercise sovereignty. It is often related to a country’s more general development policies. 
The overarching sectoral policy objectives can act as guiding principles in associated laws and 
regulations, ensuring consistency in regulatory oversight. The policy development process 
provides an opportunity to build consensus and a shared understanding of issues among 
various stakeholders. 
A mining company’s obligations within a country may be defined by a variety of legal 
instruments. The legal frameworks that determine mining companies’ obligations, whether 
legislative, regulatory, contractual or a combination of all three, must anticipate how those 
obligations will be monitored and enforced in practice.  
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In some cases, the company’s obligations are defined primarily in laws and regulations. In 
those cases, the legal framework that governs the mining industry within a country tends to 
be uniform across companies, with relatively little variation in the obligations from company 
to company. Uniform legal frameworks help simplify monitoring by providing a single set of 
rules applicable to all companies operating in the sector. Under a uniform legal framework, 
government and civil society monitoring actors must learn one common set of company 
obligations. Uniformity makes it easier for governments and civil society to monitor the 
contracts because it removes the need to make sense of and monitor multiple regimes. 
Establishing a company’s obligations in law, rather than in individually negotiated contracts, 
is one way to establish a uniform legal framework. Some countries have used model contracts 
to cut down on the proliferation of legal frameworks. Because they leave fewer terms open 
to negotiation than ad hoc contracts, model contracts can reduce transaction costs. 
In other cases, companies sign individual contracts with governments, and those contracts 
define the majority of the companies’ obligations, including taxes, environmental 
requirements and so forth. Contractual regimes can be problematic for a number of reasons. 
They leave room for corruption by requiring that deals be individually negotiated, and they 
tend to lead to worse outcomes for governments because government negotiators make 
concessions to companies during the negotiating process. Separate legal frameworks in 
contractual regimes can make it more difficult for both government and civil society to 
effectively monitor companies’ obligations.  
Clear rules and good administrative architecture facilitate effective sector oversight. Effective 
sector oversight requires clear lines of responsibility in order to minimise overlap or 
uncertainty regarding regulatory roles in sector administration. Government obligations and 
lines of responsibility for monitoring different types of obligations should be established in 
the legal framework. Wherever a company’s obligations are defined (in laws, contracts or 
regulations), respective roles and responsibilities for ensuring compliance with particular 
obligations must also be defined to ensure effective oversight. 
Clearly defined rules composed of objective factors can be easier to monitor and enforce. For 
example, following criticism from the World Bank that the lack of standards had hindered 
effective environmental monitoring and enforcement, Peru passed maximum permissible 
limits and environmental quality standards. Clear limitations on pollution levels allowed the 
government to determine whether a company has complied with the law or not. 
A key challenge for governments is attracting and retaining enough sufficiently trained staff 
to conduct the monitoring. A 2010 report from the World Economic Forum surveyed 13 
countries in three regions and found that “lack of government capacity to ensure compliance 
through contract monitoring and implementation/enforcement is a frequently cited 
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problem.”4 The required number of inspectors and inspections is driven primarily by the 
number of active mining projects and the number of workers employed in the industry. 
Beyond mere numbers of inspectors, governments must also ensure that inspection officers 
have the expertise to conduct their monitoring effectively. Capacity deficiencies result in 
insufficient, inconsistent monitoring of industry operations, which can ultimately lead to 
reduced compliance. 
Ontario, Canada, demonstrates the difficulty of effective administrative oversight of 
exploration, even for a developed country. Ontario maintains a system of mining permit 
assessment auditors to ensure that the parameters of the permits are being followed. Ontario 
receives about 1,000 assessment reports each year, and, by law, the ministry’s three 
assessment reviewers must review the listed payments to ensure that they qualify as 
exploration expenses and, if not, challenge the companies’ payments within 90 days. Even a 
relatively small mining centre with relatively large administrative capacity such as Ontario 
ends up approving 25 to 40 reports each year without reviewing them. Less than half a 
percent of the assessment reports is subject to a detailed review in which the companies have 
to justify each exploration expenditure. 
Capacity is also a challenge for civil society. Even when laws and contracts are readily 
available, civil society may lack the skills necessary to analyse and understand the deals that 
their government has negotiated with companies and the technical and engineering expertise 
to determine whether those deals are being complied with.  
Regulatory independence / autonomy is the basis for effective oversight and enforcement. 
Capacity challenges are often exacerbated by conflicts of interests. Mining ministries are 
often charged with both promoting new investment and regulating ongoing investment. 
Enforcing laws and provisions against companies can be seen as competing with the goal of 
promoting investment in the mining sector. A situation in which the same staffers are 
responsible for approving new mining permit applications and for monitoring ongoing mining 
operations creates an institutional conflict of interest in that many government agencies 
favour getting new mining projects off the ground over effectively monitoring existing 
ongoing projects. Distinct functional groups can be established so no overlap exists between 
staff responsible for approving new permit applications or reviewing mining plans and the 
staff responsible for monitoring ongoing mining operations and compliance with legal 
obligations. 
Some public officials have private interests in the mining sector and favour companies that 
are controlled by themselves, their friends and family, or their political allies. Monitoring the 
costs of subcontracts, for example, can be undermined if the official has an interest in a 
                                                          
4 World Economic Forum (2011). Stakeholder Perceptions and Suggestions, Responsible Mineral Development 
Initiative 2010. 
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certain subcontractor receiving a valuable (and possibly inflated) contract. Another personal 
conflict of interest can arise when mid-rank officials create a bottleneck through a reporting 
or approval process, establish themselves as the gatekeeper, and collect a “rent” from 
companies to pass through it. Local content compliance is one example: Companies have to 
get sign-off, and they must pay or otherwise reward the gatekeeper to get it. The incentive 
for the gatekeeper becomes capturing the rent rather than enforcing the rules. 
In most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, unified, 
semiautonomous departments are responsible for administering taxes. These bodies report 
directly to a government minister and can have a formal management or advisory board. This 
model of semiautonomous revenue agencies tries to shield the tax administration from public 
and political pressure. Revenue agencies’ performances improve most when the level of 
autonomy is relatively high and stable as in Peru, Kenya and South Africa.5 Australia relies on 
a special body, independent of the revenue agency, to report on and oversee tax 
administration. The Inspector-General of Taxation is an independent agency responsible for 
reviewing the Australian Taxation Office’s administration of the tax laws. 
Effective monitoring relies on access to information, and a lack of transparency can be a 
challenge for both government and civil society monitoring efforts. Transparency is a 
condition for effective monitoring as it creates incentives for all stakeholders (government, 
companies and communities) to play by the rules. 
Within executive government and parliament, access to information across departments is 
essential for effective monitoring. For civil society, access to contracts, ESHIAs, work plans, 
revenue collection figures and other ongoing project information is essential to monitoring 
efforts but is often lacking. Governments and companies should publish all essential 
information for monitoring mining projects, including: 
 concession agreements, including contracts, permits or licenses; 
 laws and regulations; 
 project-specific assessments and reports, including EIAs, SIAs, HIAs, EMPs, work 
programs and local development plans; 
 ongoing data on implementation and monitoring, including production figures, tax 
and royalty payments and inspection reports. 
Companies and governments are increasingly responding to growing pressures to become 
more transparent and participatory, while civil society organisations are striving to scrutinise 
deals and respond to threatened harms. The first step in civil society monitoring is to identify 
the company’s obligations and to determine which of those obligations to monitor. In a 
                                                          
5 Robert Taliercio Jr. (2004). Designing Performance: The Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority Model in 
Africa and Latin America, World Bank. 
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contractual regime, this requires access to the contracts. The next step is determining 
whether those obligations are being met during the company’s ongoing operations. The most 
effective approaches involve partnerships in which government agencies, industry and civil 
society work together to address monitoring needs and challenges.6 
Third party rights to sue for environmental damage or enforcement for breaches of 
environmental law vary from State to State. Under the Environmental Liability Directive of 
the EU, Article 12 provides that natural or legal persons: 
 affected or likely to be affected by environmental damage, or 
 having a sufficient interest in environmental decision-making relating to the damage; 
or alternatively, 
 alleging the impairment of a right, where administrative procedural law of a Member 
State requires as a precondition 
are entitled to make submissions and request the competent authority to take action. Various 
forms of such ability of third parties to take legal action against causers of environmental 
harm exist to varying degrees in Australia as well. 
In Armenia, Division 9 Chapter 60 of the Civil Code provides in article 1058 that “harm caused 
to the person or property of a citizen and also harm caused to the property of a legal person 
shall be subject to compensation in full by the person who has caused the harm. The inaction 
of State bodies which results in harm being caused to citizens or legal persons also gives rise 
to a right to seek compensation from the relevant body (Article 1063). 
Consequently, it is theoretically possible under Armenian law for individuals or corporate 
entities to sue a person who causes environmental damage. However, it would be better and 
more closely aligned with at least European practice to more carefully connect these general 
rights in relation harm to refer specifically to environmental harm.  
These third party rights, it should be noted, are in most jurisdictions rights to compel the 
State authority in charge of environmental regulation to ensure the law is complied with, 
rather than against the polluter directly. So, in Spain there are third party rights to sue the 
competent authority on the merits, where in the UK it is only a procedural review which is 
permitted by the Courts. Some EU Member States have provided interested third parties that 
have made comments or observations on development (called in Queensland “properly made 
submissions” on an EIA) rights to join actions to sue alleged polluters (such as Poland and 
parts of Austria).7 
                                                          
6 Smith, E., & Rosenblum, P. (2011). Enforcing the Rules: Government and Citizen Oversight of Mining. 
Revenue Watch Institute. 
7 It is beyond the scope of these working papers to examine the detail of legal differences between States to 
any great level of detail. For a comprehensive assessment of the integration of the EU Environmental Liability 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
Past and ongoing initiatives taken by the Armenian regulators to reform the sector have been 
taken without reference to a policy or longer term strategy. The current regulatory system is 
an evolving network of intersecting laws and regulating agencies, without clear oversight or 
direction. The government should embark on a process of developing a harmonised policy 
and regulatory framework. The first step is to develop a national resource / mineral policy 
that aims to achieve triple bottom line outcomes. Non-urgent regulatory reforms related to 
the mining sector should be put on hold during policy development. Any subsequent updates 
to laws and regulations should reflect strategic policy guidelines. 
The EIA Law requires additional technical expertise, a high level of coordination and access 
to financial resources to mainstream new environmental protection practices across 
government departments. The functions of several sub-departments within MENR overlap 
and could be better coordinated within one institution. Mechanisms for better collaboration 
between MENR and MNP need to be identified by focusing on respective roles, 
responsibilities and objectives. This could emerge through joint development of a resource / 
mineral policy.  
The oversight function is crucial in ensuring that adverse social and environmental impacts 
are mitigated and benefits enhanced. Lack of capacity is the most obvious challenge to 
effective monitoring. Several regulatory agencies do not have the required capacity to carry 
out adequate monitoring. Capacity building and training is urgently needed, and this must 
also be associated with an effort to close the gap that exists in terms of permitting, controlling 
tailings facilities and for social impact management.  
However, capacity reflects politics and priorities as well as other factors that contribute to 
sustainable and effective mining sector governance. A prevailing culture of secrecy in the 
sector hinders meaningful public participation and decision-making based on factual 
information. Initiatives to make such data publicly available for public scrutiny are therefore 
needed. The potential EITI candidacy from February 2017 can provide a helpful platform to 
improve civil society and business participation in government processes. It can alert 
government ministries that parties in the industry and civil society networks have an interest 
in how the government operates and genuinely seek to contribute to the country’s 
development. EITI membership necessitates the introduction of systems that mandate 
revenue accountability and reporting. Regular Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) meetings 
include representatives from civil society organisations, government ministries and mining 
companies. The EITI process can potentially provide an avenue for Armenia’s transition from 
                                                          
Directive (ELD), see Stephens & Bolton LLP, Study on Analysis of integrating the ELD into 11 national legal 
frameworks, 16 December 2013, EU publications, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/pdf/Final%20report%20-
%20ELD.pdf  
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the Soviet-style mining sector governance to a system with improved regulatory practice and 
greater transparency and accountability in decision-making. 
Initiatives are also needed to address the cases of conflict of interest where current or 
formerly elected politicians engage in mining project development. The government should 
consider drafting and promulgating an anti-corruption law, consistent with the UN 
Convention against Corruption, which could assist in the effort to improve autonomy and 
eradicate corrupt practices. Such law could be enforced by the existing Anti-Corruption 
Council (ACC) and require all members of the executive, judiciary and legislative branches to 
declare their assets, with severe consequences for corrupt activity for if found guilty. In 
addition, the Control Chamber of the Republic of Armenia should have the power to 
independently hold to account government ministries. 
Armenia’s legal and regulatory framework has not matured to a point in which the 
governance of mining sector promotes responsible investment and equitable development 
outcomes. However, the framework is undergoing reform with various laws, regulations and 
mandates under review or recently promulgated. The emergence of EIA system in 2014 marks 
an important milestone in the country’s efforts to better manage its environment and 
safeguard the country’s future. Reform processes of this nature and scale cannot materialise 
over a short timeframe. Regulatory reform is only a starting point for changing actual practice. 
There are organisational hierarchies to overcome and instilled cultural norms to dismantle.  
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